



Bundesministerium
des Innern

Critical Information Infrastructure Protection

Implementing a Cybersecurity Strategy in CIIP

Swiss Cyber Storm 4 – International IT-Security Conference

13 June 2013, Lucerne

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Section IT3 – IT-Security

Office of the Chief Information Officer at the Federal Ministry of the Interior



- Critical Infrastructure Protection in Germany
- Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection
- National CIIP Implementation Plan (UP KRITIS)
- Regulatory framework



Organisations and facilities

- that are of **major importance** for the community and
- whose **failure or impairment** would cause
 - a sustained shortage of supplies,
 - a significant disruption of public order,
 - or other dramatic consequences.




Critical Infrastructures Sectors

Energy	Electricity, Gas, Oil
ICT	Telecommunication, Information Technology
Transportation & Traffic	Air Traffic, See ~, Railway ~, Road ~, Logistics
Health	Medical supply, Medicines, Laboratories
Water	Supply, Disposal
Feeding	Food-Industry, ~ Trade
Finance & Insurance	Banking, Stock Market, Insurance, Financial Services
State & administration	Government & Administration, Parliament, Justice, Emergency Services, Civil Protection
Media & Culture	TV & Radio, Press, Culture, symbolic buildings



National CIP Strategy

- Joint work of all Federal Ministries,
 - guided by the Ministry of the Interior (BMI)
 - and the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK)
- Adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers on June 17, 2009.
- Summarizes the federal administration's aims and objectives and political-strategic approach already applied in practice
- Starting point for consolidation and new developments





Shared responsibility

Information security is a **shared** responsibility of

- the **state** (safeguarding internal security)
- **critical infrastructure operators** (companies and organisations – dependable delivery of services that are vital for state and society)
- **citizens** (secure own IT, show awareness to IT-related threats such as, e.g., phishing or botnetting)



Information security can only be achieved if all groups accept their responsibility




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Cybersecurity Strategy

Motivation





Cyber Threat

Informations-
abschöpfung

Veränderung,
Störung,
Zerstörung

Targeted attacks


- espionage & sabotage
- social-engineering + trojans

Individual attacks (scalpel)

- sabotage of specific IT systems (and infrastructures) with high harm potential
- complex, long-lasting preparation
- **zero-day-exploits**
- **Faked certificates**

Untargeted attacks

- Sabotage, fraud, etc.
- **SPAM, virus, worms, trojans, Drive-by-Downloads**





Cyber and IT security as priority of national government since 2009


Nov. 2009

Fall 2010

Feb. 2011

IT-Security in coalition agreement

- Strengthen IT security in public and non-public area; esp. CIIP
- Concentrate competences at Federal CIO
- Further develop BSI as national Cybersecurity agency
- Prevent unfair passing-on of IT-risks to end-user



„Stuxnet“

„Duqu“

Cybersecurity Strategy





Cybersecurity Strategy



National Cyber Security Council

National Cyber Response Center

**Critical IT
Infrastructure**

IT of Citizens

**IT in the Public
Administration**

Use of Reliable and Trustworthy Information Technology

International Cooperation (EU, worldwide)


**Response to
Cyber- Attacks**

Effective Crime Control

Personnel development Fed. Gov.




National Cyber Security Council





National Cyber Response Center





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CIIP Implementation Objectives

- Improve transparency (regarding vital processes)
- Robust foundations through standardized and auditable security level
- Autonomy of vital (IT) processes
- Ensure product and service security
- Prevent threats through continuous IT situation analysis and mutual early warning
- Prepare for serious situations by running exercises
- Improve national know-how and strength through cooperation



CIIP Implementation Plan

History

CIP Implementation Plan (UP KRITIS)



- Foundations
 - Joint responsibility for IT security in CI
 - Expansion of cross-sector and public-private cooperation
- Guiding Principle and Objectives
 - Achieve a uniformly high status of basic IT security in critical infrastructures
 - Establish a framework for trustful cooperation
 - Coordinated action in the event of a national IT crisis
- Published 5 September 2007
- Currently under revision (Dec. 2013 final)
 - Adjust objectives / install sector exchanges



Re-Enforcement of CIIP



- Re-enforcement of CIIP with National Cybersecurity-Strategy in February 2011
 - Evaluation/advancement of CIIP Implementation Plan
 - Evaluation of existing policy framework
- Top-level discussions with the relevant sectors
 - Summer 2011: 7 Minister meetings with all CI sectors



Top-level discussions May – September 2012

Main Outcomes

- Very high inter-dependencies (special role of energy and ICT)
- Present situation is heterogeneous
 - e.g. some sectors have elaborated minimum standards, risk management and security concepts, reporting infrastructure
- Number of sectors lacking standards – no transparency
- Potential for mutual information exchange on IT situation and threats



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Proposal for GER NIS Law **Key Provisions**

- Key Operators of CI
 - Minimum requirements for IT security (self-regulation / recognised standards)
 - Reporting serious IT security incidents
- Electronic communication providers
 - State-of-the-art protection of infrastructures from illegal intervention
 - Malicious software: Reporting serious IT security incidents; information and assistance of users
- Information society service providers
 - Implement protection measures to a reasonable extent
- Federal Office for Information Security
 - Annual reports to raise public awareness



- Mol-Proposal (publicly available) in inter-service consultation
- In parallel (deadline passed):
 - Feedback from around 40 business and expert associations
 - Feedback from Länder (federal states)
- As a result, currently preparation of revised proposal

Deadline: elections of Federal Parliament in Sep. 2013

- Last ordinary plenary session: 24.06. - 28.06.2013
- Generally, broad political support



Proposal for National NIS Law Draft NIS-Directive (EU)

	GER NIS LAW	NIS-DIRECTIVE (EU)
addressee	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•CI operators•Telecommunication and electronic service providers	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•CI operators with exceptions (e.g. water)•Some electronic service providers•Public administration
Requirements for CI operators (also telec. and electr. services)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Minimum IT security requirements, state of the art•Reporting of IT incidents, which (may) have impacts on the maintenance of operation of their CI.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Minimum IT security requirements, state of the art•Reporting of IT incidents, which have impact on security of core services



Proposal for national NIS law – NIS-directive

	GER NIS LAW	NIS-DIRECTIVE (EU)
Requirements ICT sector	Reporting of disturbances of telec. networks/services	non
Use of reported incident information	Sharing with CI operators	Public sharing
Enforcement	Audits	Authority for -further checks, -request for information, -instructions



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Many thanks for your attention!

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